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- (U) PHONE:
- (U) ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY:
  Associate Director for Community Integration, Policy and Records
- (U) Unless otherwise indicated, the information included in this guide addresses activity during and related to the Cuban Missile Crisis ONLY.

Description of Information	Classification/Markings	Reason	Declass	Remarks	
(U) The following guidance (items 1-8) pertains to information related to					
the Cuban Missile Crisis during the time period 1 January 1959 through 31 December 1963.					
1. (U) The fact that the	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A		
following entities were SIGINT					
targets during and related to the					
crisis:					
a. The USSR					
b. Soviet Forces in Cuba					
c. Soviet Merchant					
Shipping					
d. Cuba, to include Cuban					
Military Forces.					
2. (U) Information derived from,	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A		
or pertaining to, unenciphered					
Soviet military communications					
during and related to the crisis.					
3. (U) Information derived from,	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A		
or pertaining to, Soviet air-to-					
ground and ground-to-air GCI					
communications in Cuba during					
and related to the crisis.					
4. (U) Direction-finding results	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A		
when applied to Cuban and					
Soviet Forces during and related					
to the crisis, to include merchant					
shipping involved in aid to					
Cuba.					
5. (U) Information derived from,	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A		

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or pertaining to, unenciphered						
Cuban internal military and						
governmental communications						
during and related to the crisis.						
6. (U) Information derived from	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A			
or pertaining to Cuban air-to-						
ground and ground-to-air GCI						
communications during and						
related to the crisis.						
7. (U) Information derived from	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A			
category IIX product reports	CIVEL/ISSIFILD	14/21	14/21			
pertaining to Soviet and Cuban						
communications during and						
related to the crisis, including						
Soviet Merchant Shipping						
communications.						
8. (U) Information derived from	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A			
category II product reports						
pertaining to unenciphered						
Cuban internal military and						
governmental communications						
during and related to the crisis.						
(U) The	following guidance (items 9-1	0) pertains to inf	ormation related	to		
	e Crisis during the time perio					
9. (U) The fact that	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A			
Czechoslovakia was a SIGINT			1772			
target during and related to the						
crisis.						
10. (U) Information derived	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A			
from, or pertaining to, Czech air	ONCLASSIFIED	IV/A	IV/A			
and air defense communications						
during and related to the crisis,						
and ELINT related to those						
communications.						
(U) The	following guidance (items 11-			to		
the Cuban Missile Crisis for all time periods.						
11. (U) The fact of NSA/CSS	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	(U//FOUO) Details		
targeting/collecting diplomatic				regarding this		
and International Commercial				targeting/collection shall		
(ILC) communications during				remain classified, to		
and related to the crisis.				include identification of		
				the specific diplomatic		
				entity communicating or		
				identification of the entity		
				communicating using ILC		
				communications.		
				communications.		
				(U//FOUO) Information		
				from product reports		
				derived from diplomatic		
				and ILC communications		
				shall not be released		
				without approval from the		
1				Office of Policy and		

	1			Records.
12. (S//REL) The fact of	SECRET//	1.4 (c)	25 years*	Treestas.
targeting Soviet General Staff	REL TO USA, AUS, CAN,	211 (6)	25 75.25	
communications.	GBR, NZL			
13. (U) Information contained in	TOP SECRET//	1.4 (c)	25 years*	
Category III SIGINT reports	COMINT	1(0)	25 ) 6425	
related to the Cuban Missile				
Crisis.	Releasability determined on			
	a case-by-case basis.			
14. (U) Information reflecting	SECRET//COMINT	1.4 (c)	25 years*	
U.S. relationships with Second		111 (6)	25 ) 5425	
or Third party partners.	At a minimum.			
1 11				
	Releasability determined on			
	a case-by-case basis.			
15. (U) Identification of SIGINT	CONFIDENTIAL	1.4 (c)	25 years*	
collection systems and				
techniques.	At minimum.			
_				
	Releasability determined on			
	a case-by-case basis.			
16. (U) Information contained in	CONFIDENTIAL	1.4 (c)	25 years*	
high-level summaries that				
contain substantial amounts of	At a minimum.			
cryptologic material or high-				
level all-source conclusions	Releasability determined on			
relating to Soviet involvement.	a case-by-case basis.		1	
retaining to boviet involvement.	a case of case oasis.		<del></del>	
(U) ELINT				
(U) ELINT 17. (U) The fact of	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	
(U) ELINT 17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting		N/A	N/A	
(U) ELINT  17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of		N/A	N/A	
(U) ELINT  17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as		N/A	N/A	
(U) ELINT  17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) ELINT  17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  18. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE	UNCLASSIFIED  SECRET//	N/A 1.4 (c)	N/A 25 years*	
(U) ELINT  17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  18. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting any countries	UNCLASSIFIED  SECRET// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN,			
(U) ELINT  17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  18. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting any countries or entities during and related to	UNCLASSIFIED  SECRET//			
(U) ELINT  17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  18. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting any countries or entities during and related to the crisis other than those	UNCLASSIFIED  SECRET// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN,			
(U) ELINT  17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  18. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting any countries or entities during and related to the crisis other than those described as UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED  SECRET// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN,			
(U) ELINT  17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  18. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting any countries or entities during and related to the crisis other than those described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.	UNCLASSIFIED  SECRET// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL	1.4 (c)	25 years*	
(U) ELINT  17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  18. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting any countries or entities during and related to the crisis other than those described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  19. (U) The fact of ELINT	UNCLASSIFIED  SECRET// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN,			(U) The association of an
(U) ELINT  17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  18. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting any countries or entities during and related to the crisis other than those described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  19. (U) The fact of ELINT collection during and related to	UNCLASSIFIED  SECRET// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL	1.4 (c)	25 years*	ELNOT with its related
(U) ELINT  17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  18. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting any countries or entities during and related to the crisis other than those described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  19. (U) The fact of ELINT collection during and related to the crisis of signals from a	UNCLASSIFIED  SECRET// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL	1.4 (c)	25 years*	ELNOT with its related system nickname or other
(U) ELINT  17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  18. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting any countries or entities during and related to the crisis other than those described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  19. (U) The fact of ELINT collection during and related to the crisis of signals from a specific type of radar, identified:	UNCLASSIFIED  SECRET// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL	1.4 (c)	25 years*	ELNOT with its related system nickname or other system identifier is
(U) ELINT  17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  18. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting any countries or entities during and related to the crisis other than those described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  19. (U) The fact of ELINT collection during and related to the crisis of signals from a specific type of radar, identified: by ELNOT (ELINT	UNCLASSIFIED  SECRET// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL	1.4 (c)	25 years*	ELNOT with its related system nickname or other
(U) ELINT  17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  18. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting any countries or entities during and related to the crisis other than those described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  19. (U) The fact of ELINT collection during and related to the crisis of signals from a specific type of radar, identified: by ELNOT (ELINT notation), or	UNCLASSIFIED  SECRET// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL	1.4 (c)	25 years*	ELNOT with its related system nickname or other system identifier is
(U) ELINT  17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  18. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting any countries or entities during and related to the crisis other than those described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  19. (U) The fact of ELINT collection during and related to the crisis of signals from a specific type of radar, identified: - by ELNOT (ELINT notation), or - by nickname, or	UNCLASSIFIED  SECRET// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL	1.4 (c)	25 years*	ELNOT with its related system nickname or other system identifier is
(U) ELINT  17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  18. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting any countries or entities during and related to the crisis other than those described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  19. (U) The fact of ELINT collection during and related to the crisis of signals from a specific type of radar, identified:	UNCLASSIFIED  SECRET// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL	1.4 (c)	25 years*	ELNOT with its related system nickname or other system identifier is
(U) ELINT  17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  18. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting any countries or entities during and related to the crisis other than those described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  19. (U) The fact of ELINT collection during and related to the crisis of signals from a specific type of radar, identified:	UNCLASSIFIED  SECRET// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL  UNCLASSIFIED	1.4 (c) N/A	25 years*  N/A	ELNOT with its related system nickname or other system identifier is
(U) ELINT  17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  18. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting any countries or entities during and related to the crisis other than those described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  19. (U) The fact of ELINT collection during and related to the crisis of signals from a specific type of radar, identified: by ELNOT (ELINT notation), or by nickname, or by identification of the associated system.  20. (U) The fact of ELINT	UNCLASSIFIED  SECRET// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL  UNCLASSIFIED  CONFIDENTIAL//	1.4 (c)	25 years*	ELNOT with its related system nickname or other system identifier is
(U) ELINT  17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  18. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting any countries or entities during and related to the crisis other than those described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  19. (U) The fact of ELINT collection during and related to the crisis of signals from a specific type of radar, identified: by ELNOT (ELINT notation), or by nickname, or by identification of the associated system.  20. (U) The fact of ELINT collection during and related to	UNCLASSIFIED  SECRET// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL  UNCLASSIFIED  CONFIDENTIAL// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN.	1.4 (c) N/A	25 years*  N/A	ELNOT with its related system nickname or other system identifier is
(U) ELINT  17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  18. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting any countries or entities during and related to the crisis other than those described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  19. (U) The fact of ELINT collection during and related to the crisis of signals from a specific type of radar, identified: - by ELNOT (ELINT notation), or - by nickname, or - by identification of the associated system.  20. (U) The fact of ELINT collection during and related to the crisis of signals from a	UNCLASSIFIED  SECRET// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL  UNCLASSIFIED  CONFIDENTIAL//	1.4 (c) N/A	25 years*  N/A	ELNOT with its related system nickname or other system identifier is
(U) ELINT  17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  18. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting any countries or entities during and related to the crisis other than those described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  19. (U) The fact of ELINT collection during and related to the crisis of signals from a specific type of radar, identified: - by ELNOT (ELINT notation), or - by nickname, or - by identification of the associated system.  20. (U) The fact of ELINT collection during and related to the crisis of signals from a specific type of radar, identified:	UNCLASSIFIED  SECRET// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL  UNCLASSIFIED  CONFIDENTIAL// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN.	1.4 (c) N/A	25 years*  N/A	ELNOT with its related system nickname or other system identifier is
(U) ELINT  17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  18. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting any countries or entities during and related to the crisis other than those described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide.  19. (U) The fact of ELINT collection during and related to the crisis of signals from a specific type of radar, identified: by ELNOT (ELINT notation), or by nickname, or by identification of the associated system.  20. (U) The fact of ELINT collection during and related to the crisis of signals from a	UNCLASSIFIED  SECRET// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL  UNCLASSIFIED  CONFIDENTIAL// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN.	1.4 (c) N/A	25 years*  N/A	ELNOT with its related system nickname or other system identifier is

- by ELNOT and by				
identification of the				
associated system.	TIMOL A GOLFIED	DT/A	NT/A	
21. (U) The fact of land-based	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	
ELINT collection during and				
related to the crisis.	LINCL ACCIEIED	NT/A	NT/A	
22. (U) The fact of airborne	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	
ELINT collection during and related to the crisis.				
23. (U) The identification of	Classification lateracian I			(II) Details as letines to
	Classification determined			(U) Details relating to
types of aircraft used for ELINT	on a case-by-case basis.			specific airborne platforms and systems
collection during and related to the crisis.				used during the crisis
the crisis.				should be treated
				according to applicable
				guidance.
24. (U) The identification of a	CONFIDENTIAL//	1.4 (c)	25 years*	(U) Regardless of how
specific aircraft used for ELINT	REL TO USA, AUS, CAN,	1.4 (0)	23 years	identified.
collection during and related to	GBR, NZL			identified.
the crisis.	GBR, NZL			
25. (U) The fact of shipborne	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	
ELINT collection during and				
related to the crisis.				
26. (U) The identification of	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	
types of ships used for ELINT				
collection during and related to				
the crisis.				
27. (U) The identification of a	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	
specific ship used for ELINT				
collection during and related to				
the crisis.				
28. (U) The fact of	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	
satellite/overhead ELINT				
collection during and related to				
the crisis.				
29. (U) Details regarding	CONFIDENTIAL//	1.4 (c)	25 years*	(U) The association of a
satellite/overhead ELINT	REL TO USA, AUS, CAN,			specific ELINT intercept
collection during and related to	GBR, NZL			with satellite/overhead
the crisis.				collection is classified.
20 (II) The constitution of a	At a minimum.	1.4(.)	25*	
30. (U) The association of a	SECRET//	1.4 (c)	25 years*	
specific ELINT intercept during and related to the crisis with a	REL TO USA, AUS, CAN,			
specific type of collection.	GBR, NZL			
31. (U) The association of a	SECRET//	1.4 (c)	25 years*	+
Circular Error of Probability		1.4 (0)	23 years	
(CEP) or a confidence ellipse	REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL			
with an ELINT intercept during	ODIN, INZL			
and related to the crisis.	At a minimum.			
32. (U) Parametric data derived	SECRET//	1.4 (c)	25 years*	<u> </u>
from ELINT intercept during	REL TO USA, AUS, CAN,	1.1(0)	25 years	
and related to the crisis.	GBR, NZL			
	,			
	At a minimum.			
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(U) \* 25 years: Declassification in 25 years indicates that the information is classified for 25 years from the date a document is created or 25 years from the date of this original classification decision, whichever is later.