## (S//SI) Uncovering North Korea Nuclear Programs

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(S//SI) Not long ago, a State Department delegation to Pyongyang confronted North Korean officials with evidence that they had violated the 1994 U.S./North Korea Nuclear Agreed Framework. The U.S. knew that the North Koreans were developing a uranium enrichment capability--an effort banned by the treaty. To the surprise of many, the North Koreans admitted that this was true and declared the Framework to be null and void.
(S//SI) How did the U.S. know what the North Koreans were doing? SIGINT! The ONLY source of information on this treaty violation was SIGINT derived from North Korean external communications. A collaborative effort involving SID's China and Korea and the Proliferation and Arms Control Product Lines put the SIGINT pieces together.
(S//SI) Furthermore, our Intelligence Community colleagues provided technical information (CIA and DOE), initiated operational efforts (CIA), conducted imagery searches (NIMA), reviewed historical information (DIA and FBIS), and issued demarches (State Department) related to this uranium enrichment program.
(S//SI) Without this intelligence, the U.S. would have been unaware of the North Korean enrichment program, which, if successful, would both enhance North Korea's nuclear weapons programs and enable it to proliferate nuclear weapons material to other nations of concern. This is both a SIGINT success story and an example of how cross-organizational collaboration can produce key intelligence. Hats off to everyone involved!
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